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EQUITABLE CONCERNS OF EBA Y v. MERCEXCHANGE:
DID THE SUPREME COURT SUCCESSFULLY BALANCE
PATENT PROTECTION AGAINST PATENT TROLLS?

Leslie T. Grab'
Within the past decade, companies seeking to purchase
intellectual propertyfor the purpose of generating licensing fees
have become a major concern for U.S. businesses. These
companies are often identified as "patent trolls," and are
perceived to take advantage of successful companies that utilize
the technology by demanding often exorbitant licensingfees. The
Supreme Court's recent decision in eBay v. Mercexchange
rejected the "automatic injunction" rule and thus weakened one of
the patent troll's leveraging tools, the permanent injunction.

This Recent Development discusses the effect the Supreme
Court's recent decision in eBay v. Mercexchange' has had on
modem patent practice. Part I provides an explanation of the
history of patent trolls and their business practices. Part II is a
review of the eBay decision and cases decided after eBay to
determine how lower courts are applying the new standard for
permanent injunctions. Part III explores the potential effects of the
eBay balancing test on patentee and patent troll behavior.
In eBay, the Supreme Court adopted the traditional four-factor
test that courts of equity consider when determining whether a
permanent injunction should be issued.'
These factors are:
(1) whether the plaintiff has suffered irreparable injury;
(2) whether the remedies available at law, such as money damages,
are inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for the injury; (3) the
'J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008.
2

126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).

3id.

4 Id. at 1839.
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balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant; and
(4) whether public interest would be disserved by an injunction.'
Application of the four-factor test necessitates the balancing of
interests between the plaintiff and defendant to determine whether
a permanent injunction or some alternate remedy is warranted.'
The adoption of this balancing test overruled the more categorical
rule of granting permanent injunctions favored by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.'
A major objective for courts who hear patent infringement
cases is to balance the right of the patentee to exclude all others
from practicing their invention' with the delivery of new and useful
technology to the public.' Cases where the plaintiff is a nonpracticing patentee and wishes to exclude others by requesting a
permanent injunction may be in conflict with this goal.
The purpose of the four-factor test is to differentiate between
those patentees who do not practice their invention because of
inadequate capacity or insufficient capital, such as start-up
companies or independent inventors, as opposed to patent trolls
who exist solely to license the technology to those who use it."o
Differentiation between these two groups is critical for maintaining
the correct balance between "promot[ing] the progress of science
and the useful arts"" and preventing the exploitation of the patent
system. With eBay, the Supreme Court has provided courts with
the tools necessary to maintain the proper balance of the patent
system.

5

id.

6id.
7 Mercexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (MercexchangeII), 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
8 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
9 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
10 eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C. (eBay), 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
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HISTORY OF PATENT TROLLS

A. PatentTrolls
What exactly is a patent troll? This is the question Justice
Kennedy asked on March 29, 2006,12 the date the Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in eBay v. Mercexchange." At the closing of
the argument for eBay, Justice Kennedy asked the question, "Well,
is the troll the scary thing under the bridge, or is it a fishing
technique?"l 4 After the laughter in the courtroom died down,
eBay's counsel answered for the petitioner that a troll is much like
the "scary thing under the bridge."" eBay's experience is not so
different than many other companies who have had the unfortunate
experience of being threatened by a patent troll. 6
Patent trolls often acquire their intellectual property rights from
companies in bankruptcy or other inventors who do not wish to
commercially exploit their inventions." These trolls have not
Transcript of Record at 26, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006) (No. 05-130).
" eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
14 Transcript of Record, supra
note 12.
5Id. There is a debate as to whether Mercexchange is a true troll or not. See
generally Bambi Francisco, The Rights of a Reformed Patent Troll
Commentary: Redemption for Mercexchange?, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 30,
2006; Ed Burnette, eBay and the Case of the Possible Troll (Mar. 15, 2006),
http://uk.buildercom/manage/ip/0,39030143,39302791,00.htm
(search eBay;
then select "eBay and the case of the possible troll" hyperlink under "Features")
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Julia
Wilkinson, The eBay Patent Wars: Interview with Mercexchange CEO Thomas
Woolston,
http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y04/m09/i30/sO 1
(search
Mercexchange; then select "The eBay Patent Wars:
Interview with
Mercexchange CEO Thomas Woolston" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 27, 2006)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
16 Research In Motion was sued by an alleged patent troll, NTP. In addition,
approximately thirty-five banks have been sued by an alleged troll,
DataTreasury. See generally Glen Fest, Patently Unaware, BANK TECHNOLOGY
NEWS, Apr. 2006, http://www.banktechnews.com/article.html?id=20060403T
7612618 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'7 See Lisa Lerer, Quick Draw, IP LAW AND BUSINESS, July 2006, at 30.
Raymond Niro, founder of TechSearch, L.L.C., purchased a group of patents
relating to processor chip technology from International Meta Systems, Inc.,
which had been forced into bankruptcy. Niro then sued Intel for patent
12
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participated in the research and development of the invention, and
do not use the patented technology.'" A patent troll does not seek
to exclude others from practicing the invention, but rather it desires
to collect licensing fees from those who do use the technology.
Despite being able to list the characteristics of a patent troll, the
intellectual property community is far from settling on a common
definition of patent trolls.20 However, all agree that the term is
meant to be derogatory.2' One commentator suggests that the
definition of a patent troll is "a patent owner, frequently a small
company, which enforces patent rights against accused infringers,
but does not manufacture products or supply services based upon
the patents in question."22 Some entities, small companies in
particular, argue that this definition sweeps too broadly and
includes all patentees who do not practice their invention.23 Other
definitions seek to limit the scope of patent troll only to those
companies whose primary purpose is extracting licensing fees.24
What distinguishes patent trolls from companies who purchase
patents that complement their existing technology is that trolls do
not maintain manufacturing or research operations necessary to
infringement with the goal of receiving some compensation for holding the
patents. As a result of this suit, the term "patent troll" was born.
18 Morag Macdonald, Beware of the Troll, THE LAWYER,
Sept. 26, 2005,
http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id= 116783&d=122&h=24&f-46
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
19 Danielle Williams & Steven Gardner, Basic Framework for Effective
Responses to Patent Trolls, 17 NCPA's INTELL. PROP. L. SEC. IP LINKS 3, Apr.
2006, available at http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/publications/downloads/
IPLinksApril2006.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
20 Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, ABA JOURNAL,
Sept. 2006, at 51.
21 Alexander Poltorak, On 'PatentTrolls'
and Injunctive Relief IPFRONTLINE,
May 12, 2006, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=10854&deptid
=4 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
22

id

See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000 & Supp. 2004). This argument is based on the
fact that companies are doing the exact things for which the patent system is
designed. For example, the Patent Act grants an exclusionary right to patentees,
meaning that they can exclude others from practicing their invention. However,
this right is a negative right only, it does not grant the patentee the right to
practice their invention nor require them to do so.
24 Williams & Gardner, supra
note 19, at 1.
23
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exploit the patents.25 Many patent trolls focus their business solely
on enforcement of intellectual property rights.26
The term patent troll is used throughout this article to denote a
company whose patent portfolio is comprised of patents obtained
from other companies or individuals. The trolls themselves have
had no part in the development of the technology, nor do they seek
to practice the inventions. The business plan of a troll is to utilize
its patent portfolio to generate revenue through licensing fees and
settlement negotiations. Small companies who do not practice
their inventions due to lack of capability or capital are not intended
to be swept into the definition of a patent troll for the purposes of
this Recent Development.2 7
A highly publicized contest involved a purported troll suing
Research In Motion (RIM), the Canadian company that brought the
"BlackBerry" technology to the world. 28 RIM and its BlackBerry
technology were featured in an article in the Wall Street Journal in
2001 .29 The article was noticed by Donald E. Stout, a patent
Macdonald, supra note 18.
Williams & Gardner, supra note 19, at 3.
27 The term patent troll was coined by Peter Detkin
who, at the time, worked
as assistant general counsel at Intel, but now manages Intellectual Ventures, a
company many label as a patent troll. In 1999, Intel was being sued by
TechSearch, a company that sought to license its technology to Intel, who had
already employed the technology. See TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., No.
98-CV-03484, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2000). For further information
regarding TechSearch and Intel's legal battles, see Brenda Sandburg, Trolling
for Dollars: Patent Enforcers are Scaring Corporate America, and They're
25

26

Getting Rich-Very Rich-Doing it, THE RECORDER, July 30, 2001. Raymond

Niro, TechSearch's counsel throughout the Intel dispute, tells a different story.
He asserts that Intel was engaged in predatory business practices by threatening
companies with a freeze out if they used a competitor's, like TechSearch's,
processor chips. Mr. Niro asserts that TechSearch was simply trying to defend
itself against the unethical practices at Intel. See Raymond Niro, The Patent
Troll Myth, PROFESSIONAL INVENTORS ALLIANCE, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.

piausa.org/patentreform/articles/raymond _niro_08_04_2005 (explaining Mr.
Niro's perspective on Intel's practices and Techsearch's position) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
28 Research In Motion, http://www.rim.net (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
29 Pager Maker Gets Patentfor E-Mail Delivery, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2001,
at A2.
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attorney and co-founder of New Technologies Products, Inc.
(NTP).30 NTP was formed in 1992 by Thomas J. Campana, Jr. and
Mr. Stout as a holding company for patents relating to wireless
technology." Mr. Campana held some twenty-five patents relating
to wireless communications and Mr. Stout was an intellectual
property attorney from the Washington, D.C. area.3 2 The company
was run from Mr. Stout's home and its only asset consisted of "a
drawer full of dusty patents."" These facts caused some to classify
NTP as a patent troll, while others assert that Mr. Campana was
just a small-time inventor trying to protect his intellectual
property.34
RIM failed to acknowledge NTP's correspondence regarding
its patents, so NTP sued RIM for patent infringement in federal
district court." RIM never really took NTP seriously, a mistake
that cost it millions of dollars. 6 The jury found that RIM had
willfully infringed on NTP's patents and awarded $23 million in
damages and a royalty based upon the number of BlackBerry
devices sold in the United States.3 ' However, due to misconduct
by RIM at trial, the judge imposed enhanced damages against
RIM, increasing damages to $53 million, legal fees of $4.5 million,
and a royalty rate of 8.55%.38 The judge also ordered an injunction
against RIM prohibiting the sale of BlackBerrys in the United
States and threatened to shut down all BlackBerry service unless
RIM placed $240 million in escrow." By the end of a lengthy
30 Barrie McKenna, Paul Waldie, & Simon Avery, Patently Absurd: The
Inside Story of RIM's Wireless War (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.theglobeand
mail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060221.wpatentlyabsured-rim21/BNStory/
RIM2006/home?pageRequested=all&print-true (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
3
NTP, Inc.'s website, http://www.ntp-inc.com, has been taken down for
maintenance.
32 McKenna, Waldie, & Avery, supra note 30.
33 Id.
34 id.
3 NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D.Va. 2002).
36 McKenna, Waldie, & Avery, supra note 30.
37
id.
38

39

-d.

id.
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appeal process including a petition denied by the Supreme Court,40
a settlement with NTP was reached in early 2006. RIM agreed to
pay $612.5 million to NTP to settle all claims and purchased a
fully paid, perpetual license of the technology held by NTP.4 RIM
narrowly avoided a complete shutdown of BlackBerry service in
the United States by agreeing to settle for a sum that far exceeded
the original demand.4 2
The RIM case provides an example of how trolls thrived in the
United States marketplace prior to eBay and became a growing
concern for both the business and legal communities.
II. EBA Y, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE, L.L. C AND ITS EFFECTS

A. Mercexchange-A Troll that Challenged eBay
Mercexchange sells small electronics and purports to offer
business solutions for e-commerce.4 3 Mercexchange was founded
by Thomas Woolson, the inventor of the patents that eBay
allegedly infringed."
The patents covered business methods
directed at the use of an electronic market to buy and sell goods
through a trusted network.4 5 When eBay launched in September of
1995, its online marketplace employed many of the features
covered by Mr. Woolston's patents.46
RIM's case went through the federal court system multiple times before
RIM ultimately settled with NTP. The Supreme Court denied certiorari (126 S.
Ct. 1174 (2006)) after the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit refused to
review the decision en banc (418 F.3d 1282 (2005)).
41 McKenna, Waldie, & Avery, supra note 30; see also RIM, Research In
Motion and NTP Sign Definitive Settlement Agreement to End Litigation,
http://www.rim.com/news/press/2006/pr-03_03_2006-01.shtml (detailing RIM's
settlement with NTP) (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
42 See RIM, supra note 41.
43 For additional information
about Mercexchange, see http://www.
mercexchange.com/solutions.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2006) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
" U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed Mar. 8, 1999) (issued July 4, 2000); U.S.
Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 5, 1995) (issued Dec. 1, 1998).
45 '176 Patent; '265 Patent.
46 Ed Burnette, eBay and the Case of the Possible Troll (Mar. 15, 2006),
http://uk.buildercom/manage/ip/0,39030143,39302791,00.htm
(search eBay;
40
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Mercexchange has been labeled by some, including eBay, as a
patent troll. Jason Schultz, an attorney for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation4 7 argued that "[i]t appears that Mercexchange was
founded as a patent holding company to shake down profitable
technology businesses without contributing any significant
technology itself to the marketplace."4 8 eBay's counsel also
referred to Mercexchange as a patent troll at oral arguments before
the Supreme Court.49
However, Mercexchange characterizes itself as a direct
competitor of eBay in the online marketplace business."o
Mercexchange bolstered its claim when it began to operate an
online marketplace in 2003, selling its products primarily through
its licensee, uBid." However, eBay argued that selling items
online was not Mercexchange's primary focus. 5 2
Indeed,
Mercexchange's mission statement reflects its focus on licensing
technology by indicating that the goal is to improve businesses

then select "eBay and the case of the possible troll" hyperlink under "Features")
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
47 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org (last visited Oct. 22,
2006) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The
Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an amicus brief in eBay v. Mercexchange
on behalf of eBay urging the court not to adopt the rule of issuing automatic
injunctions upon a finding of infringement.
48 Bambi Francisco, The Rights of a Reformed Patent Troll Commentary:
Redemptionfor Mercexchange?, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 30, 2006.
49 See Transcript of Record, supra note 12.
5o Francisco, supra note 48.
5 See Mercexchange, http://www.merexchange.com/licensed.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
uBid became a licensee of Mercexchange in 2003. This marked the first time
that Mercexchange began to practice any of the technology that its patents
covered. It is interesting that Mercexchange did not utilize its technology until
eBay characterized it as a patent troll and Mercexchange was in the middle of
litigation with eBay. Jason Schultz of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
observed that "[r]etroactively entering a market simply to legitimize your legal
status doesn't change the fact that you haven't actually promoted America's
scientific progress one iota." Id.
52 Mercexchange, L.L.C., v. eBay, Inc. (Mercexchange 1), 275 F. Supp. 2d
695 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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through its networked environments.5 3 In fact, Mercexchange
enjoyed early success in its licensing scheme by securing
AutoTrader.como, Oveture, channeladvisor, and uBid as
licensees.54 One of Mercexchange's. listed licensees, ReturnBuy,
was actually forced into bankruptcy and settled with
Mercexchange when faced with a suit for infringement."
Emboldened by early licensing success, Mercexchange moved on
to its next target: eBay.
B. Mercexchange v. eBay-Decisions by the lower courts
1. Decision of the FederalDistrictCourt
Mercexchange sued eBay in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.56 The jury found that eBay willfully
infringed Mercexchange's patents and awarded Mercexchange $35
million.5 ' Although the jury found that eBay had willfully
infringed on the patents at issue, the court refused to issue a
permanent injunction as requested by Mercexchange."
When addressing the issue of a permanent injunction, the
district court acknowledged that precedent from the Federal Circuit
suggested that granting an injunction was the normal relief
following a finding of infringement, but pointed out that the

53 See Mercexchange, Mission Statement, http://www.mercexchange.com/
index.html ("Mercexchange's mission is to improve businesses through the
application of new digital technologies, especially in networked environments.
The businesses and products developed by MercExchange address large-scale
consumer needs and business inefficiencies, resulting in new ways of doing
business, new ways of creating value, and new industry paradigms.") (last
visited Oct. 27, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
54 For a full list of Mercexchange's current licensees, see http://mercexchange.
AutoTrader.com is a registered trademark (Serial No.
com/licensed.htm.
78530448).
5s Burnette, supra note 46.
5
6 Mercexchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003).
1 Id. at 698.
58 Id. at 722.
The district court also addressed various issues relating to
damages; however, through the appeals process these issues were dropped,
leaving only the issue of the injunction.
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decision was still within the sound discretion of the trial court."
This reasoning was ultimately validated by the Supreme Court
when it endorsed the same four factor test.60
Instead of following the pattern of granting an injunction upon
a finding of infringement, the trial court looked to the principles of
equity in determining whether an injunction was appropriate.6 1
These principles require the consideration of several factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction did not issue; (2) whether the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law; (3) whether granting the injunction is in the public
interest; and (4) whether the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and the defendant weighs in the plaintiffs favor.6 2 The
court applied these factors to the facts of the case in determining
whether to issue an injunction.
The district court weighed each of these factors, but ultimately
concluded Mercexchange was not entitled to an injunction.' In
reaching this decision, the court relied heavily on evidence that
Mercexchange did not practice the technology and only actively
sought to license its patents." The court reasoned that because
Mercexchange did not commercially exploit the technology but
was willing to license it, Mercexchange could not be irreparably
harmed by the denial of an injunction. 6 In support of this
conclusion, the district court cited precedent by the Federal Circuit
that the "lack of commercial activity by the patentee is a
significant factor in the calculus" of whether the patentee should be

5 Id. at 711.
See also W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock Inc., 842 F.2d 1275,
1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a district court's refusal to grant an
injunction is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard).
60 eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
61 Mercexchange I, 275 F. Supp.
2d at 711.
62 Id. (quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 785, 794
1998)).
(E.D.
Va.
63

1d

at 711.

64Id.
at 715.
65
Id. at 712.
66

d
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granted an injunction.6' The Supreme Court rejected this line of
reasoning, holding that while lack of commercial activity was
probative, it was not determinative of whether the Court should
issue an injunction. 68
The district court also considered public policy factors, later
echoed by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence.69 While public
policy may ordinarily favor a grant of injunction, there are some
cases where it is not in the public's best interest to enjoin an
infringer.o The defendant raised several arguments in support of
denying the injunction.
Among these arguments was the
questionable nature of business method patents." The United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has implemented a
second level of review for business method patents, and legislation
was introduced in Congress to eliminate the presumption of
validity for these patents.72 The court noted, while these factors
alone did not decide the issue, the fact that the patentee did not
practice-nor intend to practice-its invention was counter to the
public's interest in benefiting from the new technology.
2. Decision of the Court ofAppeals for the FederalCircuit
Despite the district court's reasons for denying a permanent
injunction, Mercexchange appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.74 The Federal Circuit found the district court's
denial of the injunction an abuse of discretion.7 ' The Federal
Circuit based its reversal on the grounds that the district court
Mercexchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003) (quoting High
Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
68 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
69 Id. at 1842.
70
Id. at 1840.
71 Mercexchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
72 Id. at 713-14 (citing Business Method Improvement
Act of 2001, H.R.
1332, 107th Cong. (2001)).
73 Id. at 714.
74 Mercexchange II, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit also
considered issues relating to infringement and validity of the patents. However,
a discussion of those issues is not relevant to the Supreme Court's reasoning,
and those issues are not discussed further.
7 Id. at 1326.
67

N.C. J. L. & TECH.

92

[VOL. 8: 81

disregarded the general rule that injunctions should be issued once
infringement has been determined."6 The only departure from the
rule, according to the Federal Circuit, occurs in cases where there
are "exceptional circumstances," something the court felt was
absent in this case.n
The Federal Circuit relied heavily on the reasoning that "the
right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the
concept of property," and the grant of an injunction is the
appropriate remedy for infringement." The court noted it was only
in rare instances where courts have acted within their discretion to
deny a permanent injunction, and this denial should be in line with
protecting the public's interest.79 The court indicated that the
current case was not "sufficiently exceptional" to warrant a denial
of a permanent injunction."
Essentially, the Federal Circuit
applied the general rule: permanent injunctions should be issued in
cases where infringement is found, absent some extraordinary
factors having a direct effect on public welfare."1
While the district court was willing to consider the grant of a
permanent injunction in light of equitable principles,82 the Federal
Circuit rejected this reasoning in favor of a general rule granting
permanent injunctions following a finding of infringement." The
rationale behind the general rule of the Federal Circuit stemmed
from the desire to protect the patent holder's property interest
above all other concerns.84 The different standards put forth by the
Id. at 1338 (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 124647 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
n Id. at 1339.
78 Id. at 1338 (quoting language from Richardson
at 1246-47).
7 Id. The court marginalized the importance of the changes in the USPTO's
practices regarding business method patents and the introduction of legislation
to flip the presumption of patent validity for business method patents. Id. at
1339.
80 Mercexchange II, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
81 See generally id. (holding that injunctions should be the norm, but not
giving examples of "exceptional circumstances" that would give rise to the
denial of an injunction).
82 Mercexchange I, 275 F. Supp.
2d at 714.
83 Mercexchange II, 401 F.3d
at 1338-39.
76

84

d
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two courts made the issue ripe for resolution by the Supreme Court
and generated a great deal of interest within the intellectual
property community."
3. The IntellectualProperty Community Takes Sides
Once the Supreme Court granted certiorari" to hear oral
arguments on the case, many amicae briefs were filed on both sides
of the issue by leading members of business, government,
academia, and non-profit foundations."
The federal government sided with Mercexchange in this
dispute after taking the opposite position with Research In Motion
in the Blackberry dispute."
Mercexchange also garnered the
support of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, who
favor strong injunctions to protect the millions of dollars invested
in the research and development of new drugs.8 9
Several
prominent universities also argued in support of strong injunctions,
representing the quintessential "small inventor" who innovates but
is generally unable to protect its intellectual property.90 Not
surprisingly, various companies that own and license intellectual
85 Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O:
Patent Law Blog, eBay v.
Mercexchange: The Law of Patent Injunctions (Mar. 13, 2006, 08:44 EST),
(on file
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2006/03/ebay_v_mercexch.html
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
86 eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005) (granting
certiorari).
87 See Crouch, supra note 85 (identifying a
list of briefs filed).
88 NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D.
Va.
2005); Brief of Research In Motion, Ltd. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130).
89 Brief for Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130); Brief for Biotechnology Indus. Org. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130).
90 Brief of Wis. Alumni Research Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130); Brief of Ass'ns of Am. Universities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130).
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property that they do not practice sided with Mercexchange as
well."
Advocating for weaker injunctions and a more flexible
standard, eBay found support among some industry giants,
including Yahoo!, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, and Micron.92 The
telecommunications and computer communities also sided with
eBay in arguing for weaker injunctions.9 3 In addition, Research In
Motion, who had just endured its own encounter with a patent troll,
gave its support to eBay.94
Other parties that did not express loyalty to either
Mercexchange or eBay also filed briefs that argued for or against
the practice of granting injunctions for patent infringement. 95

9' Brief of Martin Cooper et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130); Brief
of Qualcomm., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay, Inc. v.
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130); Brief of
Rembrandt IP Mgmt., L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay,
Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130); Brief of
United Inventors Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay,
Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
92 Brief of Yahoo! as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, eBay Inc. v.
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130); Brief of Am.
Innovators Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, eBay Inc. v.
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
93 Brief of the Computer & Commc'n Indus. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006) (No. 05-130).
94 Brief of Research In Motion, Ltd. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
95 Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130) (supporting a general rule for granting injunctions); Brief of 52 Intell.
Prop. Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, eBay, Inc. v.
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130); Brief of Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, eBay, Inc. v.
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) (arguing against the
grant of injunctions); Brief of IBM, Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130)
(stressing the importance of considering equitable principles in determining
whether injunctions should issue).

FALL 2006]

Equitable Concerns of eBay

95

C. eBay v. Mercexchange-Decisionof the Supreme Court
1. Justice Thomas's Opinion
Although the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in
the case, the controlling decision is not entirely clear due to the
differing methodological approaches of the various Justices. The
Court held that the four-factor test generally applied when
considering a grant of injunctive relief should also be applied in
patent cases.9 6 The factors the trial court must consider when
deciding whether to issue an injunction are: (1) whether the
plaintiff has suffered irreparable injury; (2) whether remedies
available at law, such as money damages, are inadequate to
compensate the plaintiff for the injury; (3) the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and the defendant; and (4) whether public
interest would be disserved by an injunction."
The Court stressed that there was no evidence in the Patent
98
Act creating a presumption in favor of issuing an injunction. In
fact, the Court stressed the language that injunctions "may" be
issued "in accordance with the principles of equity."99 The Court
compared the provisions of the Patent Act to those of the
Copyright Act governing similar injunctions.'o The Copyright Act
gives copyright owners a right to exclude others from using their
property and indicates injunctions may be issued."o' However,
courts have treated copyright infringement differently than patent
infringement and have granted injunctions in accordance with
equitable considerations rather than by application of a mechanical

rule.102
The Court rejected both the automatic injunction rule set forth
by the Federal Circuit as well as the reasoning of the district court
that a plaintiffs willingness to license its patent created a
96

eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).

97 Factors taken from Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13

(1987). These are the same factors considered in Mercexchange I, 275 F. Supp.
2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003).
98 Codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
99 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000 & Supp. 2004); eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839-40.
'00 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004); eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
"' 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
102 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
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The Supreme Court's
presumption against an injunction.' 3
decision emphasized the trial court should apply the
aforementioned factors to the facts at issue in the case to determine
whether an injunction is warranted.'"
2. ChiefJusticeRoberts's Concurrence-Emphasison History
Chief Justice Roberts issued a concurring opinion in which
While Chief Justice
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined.o'
Roberts agreed with the Court's holding that the grant of injunctive
relief is grounded in equity, he also indicated that injunctions
historically have been given freely where they are found to be
warranted.o' Significantly, Chief Justice Roberts noted the longstanding practice of granting injunctions in patent cases where
He reasoned this practice comports
infringement was found.'
of
equity
in that monetary relief does not
principles
with the
remedy the loss of the right to exclude others from practicing the
invention.'
Monetary relief, according to the Chief Justice,
necessarily implicates the first two factors of the balancing test:
irreparable harm and lack of remedies at law.o' While his opinion
seems to suggest that most cases will favor granting an injunction,
Chief Justice Roberts rejects the notion that satisfaction of the first
two factors of the test creates a rule favoring injunctive relief."0
With his focus on historical practice, Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion fails to address the dramatic changes to the patent
landscape that have occurred over the past decade. However,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence directly addresses the issues of
patent trolls and business method patents."'

103Id. at

1840-41.

0 Id.

'o' Id. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
1o6 id.
107 id.
1os

eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
at 1841.
Id.

0o Id.
"'

111 Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence-ModernPatent Landscape
Justice Kennedy's concurrence garnered the most support from
the other members of the Court with Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer joining his opinion.1 12 Justice Kennedy emphasized the
major changes patent practice has undergone in the last decade and
that trial courts need versatile tools to deal with the ever-changing
nature of these cases."' Instead of advocating for a mechanical
rule that should fit all cases, Justice Kennedy's concurrence urged
courts to consider the current practices within patent law and
weigh them against the traditional four factors for injunctive relief
adopted by the Court." 4
While Justice Kennedy agreed with both the Court's holding
and Chief Justice Roberts's historical focus, he cautioned courts to
be aware of the current practices in patent law and to consider
modern patent practices."' Justice Kennedy acknowledged that
patent practice has changed dramatically over the years.
Historically, patent disputes involved a patentee suing its licensee
for exceeding the scope of the license or two practicing patentees
infringing on each other's technology. "' Today, many patent
infringement suits involve patentees who do not seek to practice
their inventions but rather seek only to license them."'
Without using derogatory terminology, Justice Kennedy gave
an accurate representation of the business practice of patent
trolls."' He pointed out that the presumption of an injunction, in
the hands of a troll, can be used as a tool to extract "exorbitant
fees" from companies who wish to license or practice the

112 id

"
114

Id.
eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).

"5 id.

Robert H. Resis, Esq., History of the Patent Troll and Lessons Learned,
Winter 2006, Vol. 17, No. 2 at 1.
"7 id.
"8 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 ("An industry has developed in which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees.") (citing FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38-39 (Oct. 2003)).
116

INTELL. PROP. LITIG.,
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invention.119 Since these firms rarely practice the invention
themselves, granting injunctions can hinder one of the goals of
patent law, to put the invention into the hands of the public.'20
Justice Kennedy also addressed the situation where the
infringing technology is only a small part of the infringer's
business. 2 ' In these cases, the infringer does not compete directly
with the patentee and the patentee does not suffer loss of profit or
name recognition. Hence, the grant of monetary relief may be
more appropriate and prevent the public interest from being
disserved by the grant of an injunction.'2 2
Justice Kennedy also addressed the concern over another recent
development within patent law: the USPTO's practice of granting
patents on business methods. He indicated the grant of injunctive
relief may pose additional problems when the patent at issue
covers a business method.'23 Justice Kennedy recognized that
these patents are typically vague and their validity suspect.'2 4
Often in patent infringement litigation, the defendant may request
that the USPTO conduct a reexamination procedure.'25 The
reexamination may confirm the patent was properly granted or
may result in finding the patent is invalid and unenforceable.' 26
However, if injunctive relief is granted, the defendant would not be
able to practice the invention during the period of reexamination.' 27
Justice Kennedy indicated that these types of situations must be
considered when applying the four-factor test to the controversy.'
Justice Kennedy's concerns have not gone unnoticed by the
rest of the patent community; the concern over these types of
patents has prompted the USPTO to add a higher level of scrutiny
119
2 0 Id

1

121

d

id

122 id
123 id

124
125
126

eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
d

A permanent injunction would force the defendant to cease all activity until
such time as the patent was declared invalid.
128 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842.
127
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for business method patents.129 In addition, an amendment to the
Patent Act"3 was proposed to change the presumption for validity
in cases involving business method patents."' Justice Kennedy
urged courts to consider these facts when determining the type of

relief to award.132
The plurality of the Court... recognized the historical practice
of granting injunctions may not be appropriate in modem patent
practice. They advocated for a more flexible approach by courts
when determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate.'34 This
type of flexibility is necessary for courts to adapt to "the rapid
technological and legal developments in the patent system." 35
Thus, the Court's decision to reject the general injunction rule
is appropriate for most cases of patent infringement and should
promote a new method of thinking for companies involved in
litigation. Rather than counting on an automatic injunction upon a
finding of infringement, plaintiffs must now prove the four factors
discussed by the Court to receive injunctive relief. While the test
outlined by the Supreme Court seems straightforward in its
application, it will be up to the lower courts to apply it.

Jeffery E. Young, Patenting of Financial Business Methods Gains
Momentum, http://www.buildingipvalue.com/06USCan/072_076.htm
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
30 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
'1 Business Method Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong.
(2001).
132 eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006).
'3 Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.
134 See generally eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (indicating that courts need
flexible tools to adapt to the changing patent practice).
135 Id. at 1842.
129

100
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D. Life After eBay--Application of the Four-Factor Test and
Alternative Remedies
Several cases have been decided since the eBay decision.
Some of these cases are explored in more detail in the following
section. Generally, courts have tried to apply the factors as
intended by the Supreme Court; however, the result is not always
the same. As the following cases suggest, application of the test
gives no consistent result as to whether an injunction will be
issued. In general, courts have heeded the instruction of Justice
Kennedy to consider the business practices of the plaintiff in
deciding whether an injunction should be issued.' 6 However,
defendants cannot assume that injunctive relief is no longer a threat
as they go forward with litigation.'
1. Injunction Denied
District courts in the post-eBay environment have carefully
applied the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in balancing
each factor of the test as it applies to the plaintiff and defendant.
In the Eastern District of Texas, z4 Technologies ("z4") sued
Although
Microsoft alleging infringement of certain software.'
the jury found that Microsoft had infringed on z4's patents, the
court refused to issue a permanent injunction.'39 As with eBay,
Microsoft was dealing with a purported troll. z4 did not practice
their invention but sought to license it for use in larger software

See Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, slip op.
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F.
Sup. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
13
Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006 WL 2385425,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61469 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006); Smith & Nephew, Inc.
v. Synthes (U.S.A.), No. 2:02-CV-02873, slip op. (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2006).
138 z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex.
2006).
139 d
136
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packages.'4 0 The jury found that Microsoft had willfully infringed
on the patents and issued a damage award of $115 million. 4 '
The plaintiff, z4, then requested that Microsoft be forced to
remove the offending software 4 2 until it could be redesigned so as
not to infringe. Microsoft protested and testified that its new
software would not have the infringing technology and that an
injunction would be devastating to its business.'4 3 The court
applied the eBay factors and determined that z4 was not
irreparably harmed and a monetary award was appropriate.144
The court noted that z4 did not compete directly with Microsoft
and thus was unlikely to lose licensing revenue as a result of
The fact that the infringing
Microsoft's infringement. 14
technology was only a portion of the product was also a factor in
denying an injunction.146 The court's reasoning was heavily based
on the public's interest and balance of hardships between the
parties, which would not have been a focus before eBay.147 The
district court considered Justice Kennedy's admonition to weigh
the business practices of the plaintiff and the use of the infringing
product in reaching the conclusion that a permanent injunction was

not warranted.148
Id. at 439. The technology at issue involved a product activation feature
that prevented unauthorized copying of software. The registration information
is sent by the software to a remote server which verifies the registration
information. Without this authentication process, the product will not work.
140

41 Id.
142 Id. The software at issue included XP products since 2001 and Office
products since 2000.

143 Id. at 442.

'" z4 Technologies, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 444.
14 51Id. at 440.
14 6 id.
47
1

Id. at 443.
See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(applying the four factor test from eBay to deny the grant of a preliminary
injunction). However, there was a strong dissent from Judge Newman
advocating that equitable concerns may weigh in favor of a preliminary
injunction in order to maintain the status quo in advance of litigation. See id.;
see, e.g., Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, slip op.
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (illustrating another example of how courts are
applying the eBay decision by holding that although the patents were infringed,
148
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However, some courts have been reluctant to extend the
equitable considerations of the four-factor test beyond the named
plaintiff in a suit. In Voda v. Cordis Corp.,49 the court refused to
extend the notion of irreparable harm beyond the plaintiff to his
exclusive licensee.' The court rejected the argument by Voda that
he suffered irreparable harm because the infringing activity of
Cordis harmed his relationship with Scimed, the exclusive licensee
of the technology."' The court reasoned that the harm to Scimed
was irrelevant because it had not elected to join the suit to enforce

the patent rights.152
The court's refusal to extend the scope of the harm beyond the
named plaintiff may have significant implications for inventors and
their exclusive licensees in deciding which party wishes to bring
suit to enforce the patent rights.'
2. Injunction Granted
The fears expressed by some that the Supreme Court's decision
would essentially prohibit the grant of injunctive relief can be
allayed somewhat by the following two decisions in which a
permanent injunction was issued.'54
Paice was not entitled to injunctive relief on the grounds that the infringing
technology was a small portion of Toyota's hybrid engine technology and that
the use of the infringing technology by Toyota did not interfere with Paice's
market share or name recognition).
49
' No. CIV-03-1512-L, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006).
50

Id. at 6.

SId.

152

Id. at 5.

In cases where there is an exclusive licensee, the patentee and licensee may
contract such that the licensee has the right to sue to enforce the patent rights.
However, this contractual right does not necessarily confer standing upon the
licensee. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has denied
standing to an exclusive licensee when the term of the license did not extend to
the whole term of the patent. For a further discussion, see Samantha French,
Limited-Term Exclusive Licenses Lack Independent Standing to Sue for Patent
Infringement (2006), http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/February2006lP
ReportFrenchArticle.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
154 Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006
WL 2385425,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61469 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006); Smith & Nephew v.
Synthes (U.S.A.), No. 2:02-CV-02873, slip op. (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 2, 2006).
1
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In the first example, Smith & Nephew sued Synthes alleging
infringement of patents held by Smith & Nephew concerning
certain medical devices."' After a finding of infringement, Smith
& Nephew requested a permanent injunction prohibiting Synthes
from manufacturing or selling the infringing products.'56 Synthes
claimed that the infringing products did not compete heavily with
Smith & Nephew's products and thus further sales of the infringing
products would not significantly affect Smith & Nephew's
business."' In addition, Synthes argued that because Smith &
Nephew had been willing to license its technology to competitors
in the past it could be adequately compensated by monetary
damages alone.' 8 However, the court, applying the eBay factors,
acknowledged that Smith & Nephew was a smaller company
whose market momentum and ability to form customer
relationships would be damaged by the continued sale of the
infringing products.'5 9 Even if the lost profits could be calculated
to a reasonable certainty, the loss of the market share and ability to
form customer relationships made monetary relief inequitable.160
The court rejected the notion that the plaintiffs willingness to
license weighed against injunctive relief.'6 1
The court
characterized the eBay test as a "balancing test" in which the
plaintiff must demonstrate it is entitled to an injunction by a
totality of the circumstances weighing in their favor.162 Smith &
Nephew demonstrated that the infringement by Synthes caused
irreparable harm that could not be remedied by a monetary
award.163 In addition, the balance of hardships and the public

" Smith & Nephew, No. 2:02-CV-02873. The patents involved in the suit
(U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,167,663 and 5,312,406) were directed to intramedullary nails
and methods used for treating femoral fractures.
'1 Id. at 2.
'57 Id.
id
"' Id. at 3.
158

16o
161
162
63

1

Id. at 7.

Smith & Nephew, No. 2:02-CV-02873 at 7.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 11.
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interest weighed in favor of the grant of permanent injunctive relief
against Synthes."
In the second example, Telequip Corp. ("Telequip") obtained a
default judgment against defendant, The Change Exchange, after
the defendant's failure to respond to the motion detailing the
alleged infringing activity.' 5 The court considered only the wellpled allegations from Telequip's complaint ruling that the plaintiff
had satisfied the four-factor test set forth in eBay and thus was
entitled to a permanent injunction.' 6
While it is not yet clear how the issue of permanent injunctions
will ultimately be treated by the courts, early decisions suggest that
courts may be more reluctant to issue permanent injunctions in
cases of patent infringement.
3. Alternative Remedies to Injunctions
If a patentee fails to meet the burden to show that it is entitled
to a permanent injunction, the remedy available is limited to
monetary damages.' 7 Monetary damages can incorporate several
factors including: lost profits, royalties for infringing products
sold, compensation for future infringement, and licensing fees."'
In the case of patentees who do not practice the invention or sell a
product, calculation of lost profits and a reasonable royalty
becomes less certain or altogether impossible."' When there are
no profits on which to base a dollar amount for damages, the
ultimate result may be a court-ordered or "compulsory license."' 70
"A compulsory license is an involuntary contract between a
willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the
164 Id.

Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006 WL 2385425,
*1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61469, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006).
165Telequip
166 id

eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
Mitchell Stockwell, eBay: A Changed Legal Landscape, 185 PAT. WORLD
23 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/publications/
downloads/Patentworldmstockwellseptember2006.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
167
168

169 id.
170 id.
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state.""'
Compulsory licensing schemes are often used for
unblocking dependent patents in cases where a patent is not being
used, or "where an invention relates to food or medicine."l72
Compulsory licensing schemes are in place in many other
jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom and continental
western Europe.'17
The compulsory licensing schemes are
designed to reduce the leverage of patent trolls within these
markets.'74
Compulsory licensing within the United States with regard to
patents is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), which enables the
government to use or authorize the use of a patent without the
express permission of the patentee. 75 The statute authorizes the

1'
Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing:
The
Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 349 (1993) (quoting P.

GORECKI, ECON. COUNCIL OF CANADA, REGULATING THE PRICE OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN CANADA: COMPULSORY LICENSING, PROD. SELECTION,
& Gov'T REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMMES (1981)).
172 Id. at 350. A dependent patent is a patent that cannot be practiced without
infringing on an already issued patent. Unblocking may be used when the
dependent patent is of much more value than the patent prohibiting its use.
'71 Id. at 352-53. Many countries have ratified the provisions of Article 5 of
the Paris Convention, including the United States. For an excellent overview of
the countries who subscribe to the Paris Convention and their compulsory
licensing schemes, see id. at Appendix A. See also Patents Act 1977, 2006,
c. 37; § 48 (Eng.), available at http://www.ukpats.org.uk/patentsactl977.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Regulation (EC)
816/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1, availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
site/en/oj/2006/1157/1 15720060609en00010007.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
174 Id; see also Sarah Buchner, Trade Law Center for Southern Africa,
Compulsory Licensing (Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.
php?id=19 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The
compulsory licensing schemes are also designed to promote the availability of
pharmaceuticals to developing countries. Id. Pharmaceutical companies and
other research groups are opposed to these schemes arguing that they actually
hinder the development of new drugs. Id. Their argument is that companies are
less likely to invest in expensive research if they may be forced into an
unfavorable license by the government. Id. However, these compulsory
licensing schemes are critically important for maintaining the welfare state in
Europe. Id.
1
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
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patentee to recover damages in the form of a reasonable royalty.' 6
However, due to intense opposition,"' this doctrine has not been
extended beyond limited use by the government. Historically,
compulsory licensing has only been used in the U.S. when a
governmental entity claims the use of a patent through its
sovereign power' or as a remedy in anti-trust cases.17
Many patentees argue that the only sufficient remedy for
infringement is an injunction because it is the only result that
adequately protects the right to exclude others under the patent.'
However, in cases where the plaintiff is a patent troll and its
business is licensing patents, this argument is not very
compelling.'"' On the contrary, the grant of a license and monetary
damages are almost identical to the troll's original objectives.
Nevertheless, trolls have opposed the compulsory license as a
remedy. One reason for this opposition is that the terms of the
license are set by the court and not the patentee and, thus, may
result in a lower fee than desired.'8 2

176

Id.
'n See Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Focus on the Corporation,6
EAT THE STATE! 7, Nov. 21, 2001, http://eatthestate.org/06-07/FocusOnCorp
oration.htm (commenting on the United States Government's refusal to exercise
its power under § 1498(a) to make the antibiotic Cipro available to the public
during the Anthrax scare following the terrorist attacks of 9/11) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
.7835 U.S.C. § 181 (2000 & Supp. 2004) dictates that any patent containing
subject matter that may be of a threatening nature to national security can be
made available to the government. A patentee is entitled to compensation under
35 U.S.C. § 183 (2006). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2182, 2457 (2000 & Supp. 2004) also
make patents available to the Department of Energy and NASA, respectively.
179 Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264 slip op. (E.D.
Tex. July 7, 2006) is a recent example of how a district court may use a
compulsory license to avoid a monopoly.
180 Raymond P. Niro, The Patent Troll Myth, PROF'L INVENTORS ALLIANCE,
Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.piausa.org/patent-reform/articles/raymondpniro
08 04 2005 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Williams & Gardner, supra note 19 ("[T]he typical patent troll has only
one objective-recovering as much money as possible, as soon as
possible ... ).
182 Compulsory licenses have become an issue within the United States, as
evidenced by Rep. Sherrod Brown introducing a measure to grant compulsory
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Despite the intense opposition to a compulsory license, at least
one court has imposed this remedy upon finding that a permanent
injunction was not warranted.'
After finding that DirectTV
infringed on Finisar's patents, the court ordered DirectTV to pay
damages as well as an ongoing royalty for the life of the patent, but
allowed DirectTV to continue using the infringing product.'84 An
important factor in the court's rationale for granting a compulsory
license was that DirectTV and EchoStar were the only businesses
employing this technology and granting a permanent injunction
against DirectTV would create a de facto monopoly in EchoStar's
favor.' 85
III. EFFECT OF EBA YON PATENT TROLLS AND PATENT HOLDERS

A. Patent Trolls
Given the application of the eBay'8 6 decision by courts thus far,
it is clear that the risk of a permanent injunction against defendants
is diminished. Depriving the patent trolls of the leverage that a
permanent injunction provides may have significant effects on the
litigation strategies of both the trolls and their targets.'
Target
companies may be more willing to take their case to court in an
attempt to invalidate the patents at issue.' If they lose, the result
may only be in damages, which ultimately may be lower than the
initial demand for a license fee by the troll.'89
licenses of patented inventions in certain health care emergencies. See H.R.
4131, 109th Cong. (2005).
183 See FinisarCorp. No. 1:05-CV-264.
184 Id
185 Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently 0: Patent Law Blog,
Injunction
Denied--Compulsory License Granted (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.patentlyo.
com/patent/2006/08/injunctiondeni.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
86
eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
187 Stockwell, supra note
168.
188 Williams & Gardner, supra note
19.
189 Alexander Poltorak, On 'Patent Trolls' and Injunctive Relief 6 PAT.
STRATEGY & MGMT. 12 (May 2006), reprinted in IPFRONTLINE (May 12, 2006),

available at http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=10854&deptid=4.
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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Successful patent trolls often have a well-developed business
plan.' They seek to acquire patents on technology that is either:
(1) used in a wide variety of products; or (2) a critical element of a
system already being utilized.19 ' Obtaining these types of patents
has several advantages. First, by targeting well-known companies
who already use the technology, the troll may be able to obtain
some "high profile" licensees that will serve to increase the
visibility and credibility of the troll's technology.' Before eBay,
if the disputed technology was a component of a widely used or
critical system, the threat of injunction may have persuaded
companies to accept the license fee offer without much
resistance.1'
Another business strategy employed by patent trolls is to
attempt to secure many licensees by requesting modest licensing
fees.'94 The licensing fees requested are often less than $100,000;
however, the number of companies targeted may be in the
hundreds.'95 The rationale behind this type of licensing scheme is
that companies may be willing to pay the modest fee just to make
the troll go away.' 96 However, this response only serves to
strengthen the troll's position; if trolls are successful with some
companies, they can use that success as leverage against future
targets.'97 The larger the troll's roster of licensees, the less able
companies will be to resist the troll's request for a license.'
However, from the troll's perspective, because there are many
targets, they may be unwilling to pursue a target that simply
refuses to pay.'99 In these situations, the cost of litigation could
still quickly exceed any benefit the troll may receive from the
modest licensing fee.200
19o Williams & Gardner, supra note 19.
191
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192 id

193
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Id. at 3.
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Id.
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Other trolls seek larger licensing fees from a more select group
of targets, typically asking for fees between $200,000 and
$750,000.201 Again, the troll must set the licensing fee in order to
make it more efficient for the alleged infringer to simply pay the
fee rather than litigate.202
Some trolls are especially greedy; they seek an enormous
payoff from a very select number of targets.203 The licensing fees
requested by these trolls have often exceeded $10 million.2 " Often
the companies targeted are heavily invested in the use of the
technology held by the troll.205 Unlike other demands by trolls, the
cost of litigation may actually be lower than paying the fee.206
However, a targeted company risks losing at trial. If the target
company decides to defend the action and loses, it risks being
permanently enjoined from using the technology, a result that
could have devastating effects. 207 Trolls may now be forced to
change their strategies by lowering the initial licensing fees below
the cost of litigation to avoid the exposure of their patents to
possible invalidation, a result that would cripple their business.208
Additionally, a target company may be more willing to litigate on
patents that are critical to its business now that an injunction does
not automatically issue.209
Another possible outcome is that the trolls may alter their
business strategies. The trolls whose business plans involve
targeting a small number of companies and requesting large
licensing fees may find that these companies are more willing to
go to trial rather than pay the fee.210 During the course of litigation,
the target company will have the opportunity to challenge the
201
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203
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206 id
207

Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars: Patent Enforcers are Scaring
Corporate America, and They're Getting Rich-Very Rich-Doing it, THE
RECORDER, July 30, 2001.
208

Williams & Gardner, supranote 19, at 4.

209 Id.
210

d

N.C. J. L. & TECH.

110

[VOL. 8: 81

validity of the troll's patents.2 11 If the patents are declared invalid,
the whole business strategy of the troll is destroyed, and it will be
unable to continue to license its technology.
However, the Supreme Court's decision is unlikely to affect
trolls requesting smaller licensing fees. Companies may still find
that paying the licensing fee is the most cost-effective option.212
As a result, trolls may adjust fees accordingly to encourage
companies to accept the offer for licenses.213 From a cost
perspective, paying the licensing fee may be better for a
company's bottom line; however, the result may only encourage
the troll to select other companies as targets.2 14
The four-factor test set down by the Supreme Court will likely
undermine the grant of injunctions to patent trolls.215 The factors to
consider when deciding whether to grant an injunction are: (1) did
the plaintiff show that they suffered irreparable injury; (2) are the
remedies available at law, such as damages, inadequate to
compensate the plaintiff for that injury; (3) considering the balance
of the hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant, is a
remedy in equity warranted; and (4) would the public interest be
disserved by a permanent injunction? 216
The quintessential patent troll, one who does not practice an
invention but seeks only to license it, will likely have difficulty
proving the second prong of the four-factor test. When the
patentee, whether it is an inventor or an assignee, does not practice
In patent infringement cases, courts hold a "Markman hearing" prior to
trial in which the parties submit their differing interpretations of the claims. The
court then construes the language of the claims and defines terms within the
claims of the patent for the purpose of the litigation. In some cases the parties
may elect to settle after the Markman hearing if one party's interpretation of the
claims is deemed to be invalid. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In addition,
companies may petition the U.S.P.T.O. for an "inter partes" reexamination of
the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 311. The patent may subsequently be found to be
invalid and thus unenforceable.
212 Williams & Gardner, supra note 19, at 3.
211
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the technology at issue, it is difficult to argue that an injunction is
the only appropriate remedy for infringement. For trolls, and
perhaps all non-practicing patentees, monetary damages will most
likely be appropriate.2 17
Trolls may also have problems with the third prong of the
analysis that examines the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant. When dealing with a non-practicing
patentee, trolls will be hard-pressed to argue that allowing the
defendant to practice its invention would be a hardship.2 18
Additionally, when the technology at issue is a critical component
of the defendant's technology, the hardship of an injunction may
weigh heavily on the side of the defendant.2 19 This rationale is
reflected in Justice Kennedy's concurrence when he addressed
situations where the infringing technology is only a part of the
defendant's whole business plan.220
Justice Kennedy's observations were relevant in two recent
decisions from the federal district courts.22 1 In both instances, the
defendants' use of the infringing technology was limited to a
component of their product.222 For Microsoft, the authentication
software was used to verify the purchase of a Microsoft product
and was not incorporated into the day-to-day operation of the
program.223 In Toyota, Paice's technology was incorporated into
part of the hybrid drive engines of several of Toyota's hybrid
Steve Gardner, Partner, Kilpatrick Stockton, L.L.P., Intellectual Property
Innovations Class: A Review of 2006 Patent Case Law and Its Implications for
In-House Counsel, 2006 Intellectual Property Innovations Series (Aug. 3, 2006)
(slide presentation and audio available at http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/
publications/videos.aspx (follow hyperlink to article)) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
218 See Smith & Nephew v. Synthes (U.S.A.), No. 2:02-CV-02873, slip op.
(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 2, 2006) (holding that the hardship demonstrated must be
separate from the other party's practice of the invention).
219 See z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D.
Tex. 2006); Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, slip op.
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
220 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
221 See z4 Technologies, 434 F. Supp. 2d 437; Paice,No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF.
222 See z4 Technologies, 434 F. Supp. 2d 437; Paice,No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF.
223 z4 Technologies, 434 F. Supp. 2d
at 438.
217
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vehicles. 224 In both instances, the trial court cited the language of
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in making the determination that an
injunction should not be issued.22 5
The eBay decision may also inform cases in which business
method patents are at issue, such as with the company
DataTreasury. 226 Because of the sometimes vague nature of
business method patents,227 courts may be reluctant to grant an
injunction because the scope of the patent may not be established
at the time of litigation.22 8 In addition, an injunction may not be in
the best interest of the public, as it would exclude the use of some
new method of doing business.2 29
Trolls have long relied on the "automatic injunction" rule that
existed prior to the eBay decision to leverage larger licensing and
settlement fees out of their opponents by threatening litigation.
Now, instead of receiving a guaranteed injunction if their patents
are found to be infringed, trolls will be obligated to prove the
elements of the test, which may lead to more defendants
challenging the trolls' demands.
B. Small Businesses/IndependentInventors
The main focus of the eBay decision has been on its effect on
patent trolls; however, a real danger exists for small companies or
independent inventors that cannot afford to practice their
technology. Many of these small businesses must disclose their
patented technology to venture capitalists and others in order to
Paice, No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF at 3.
z4 Technologies, 434 F. Supp. 2d 437; Paice,No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF.
226 For a description of DataTreasury and
its business practices, see Glen Fest,
Patently Unaware, BANK TECH. NEWS, Apr. 2006, http://www.banktechnews.
com/article.html?id=20060403T7626I8 (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). It is interesting to note that
DataTreasury argues that its patents are architectural in nature and are not
business method patents.
227 See supra Section
II(C)(3).
228 But see Stockwell, supra note 168 (arguing that the
jury will already have
passed on the vagueness issue before the motion for a permanent injunction is
heard).
229 Williams & Gardner, supra
note 19.
224
225
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obtain the necessary capital to begin manufacture. 230 These small
businesses may also disclose their technology to a larger
competitor or potential licensee in order to generate revenue.2'
However, now that injunctions are not the norm, larger companies
will feel free to take the technology knowing that, most likely, they
will only have to pay damages and will benefit enormously from
the technology.
Since infringers have less reason to fear being enjoined, they
may be disinclined to settle the claim, instead challenging the
patentees to sue them. For many small, independent inventors,
litigation is not an option. Not having enough capital to practice
their invention, they certainly do not have enough to pay the
enormous legal fees associated with patent litigation.
The four-factor test that will help stem the abuses of trolls can
also be a difficult hurdle for small businesses seeking to obtain
injunctions against large corporations.23 2 Many small businesses,
like patent trolls, do not practice their invention, although this may
be due to inadequate facilities or capitalization and not part of a
deliberate business plan. Independent inventors, like Dr. Voda,233
must license their patents to companies that have the capacity to
take them to market. If courts, as in the Voda case, decline to
extend the permanent injunction to licensees of independent
inventors, then these inventors will lose the rights conferred by the
patent.2 34 Larger companies that have the capacity to pay the
damage awards will simply take the technology and use it.
Because the patentee may not be able to tip the balance of the fourfactors in its favor, it may be limited to monetary damages alone.

Mario W. Cardullo, World Intellectual Property Organization, Intellectual
Property-The Basis for Venture Capital Investments, http://www.wipo.int/
sme/en/documents/venturecapital investments.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2006)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
231 Id.
232 See supra Part
II(C).
233 Voda v. Cordis, Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L,
slip op. (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5,
2006).
234 The grant of a patent confers the right to exclude others
from practicing the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
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However, even if small companies or independent inventors
receive a large monetary award, the permanent damage has been
done. Without an injunction, the infringing corporation has full
use of the technology and can often manufacture the product on a
larger scale and at a cheaper price than the patentee. Because the
patentee will now have to compete with a larger, perhaps wellknown corporation, it may be ultimately frozen out of the market.
This scenario was considered by the district court in Smith &
Nephew.235 The court noted that if Synthes were to continue its
infringing behavior, the relationships between Smith & Nephew
and its surgeon clients would be forever damaged, thus
necessitating a permanent injunction against Synthes.2 36
IV.
CONCLUSIONS
In order for courts to be successful in their application of the
eBay decision, they must carefully weigh the four factors set forth
in the opinion. A large part of this careful consideration must be
directed at discerning the relative positions of the plaintiff and
defendant. The line between a patent troll and a legitimate
patentee can be difficult to draw. In both cases, the court may find
that the plaintiff does not practice its invention and only seeks to
license its patents. Courts must look beyond these facts and
determine whether the plaintiff is a fledgling company seeking to
establish itself in the market or if the company simply exists to
license the technology with no intentions of practicing the
invention.
To make the distinction, courts must consider the overall
business plan of the company and whether the infringer will
effectively remove any opportunity for the company to succeed in
the marketplace if allowed to continue infringing on the company's
technology. If the company will be harmed by the continued
activity of the infringer through the loss of its market share or
existing customers, courts should grant the injunction to prevent an
inequitable result. However, if the lawsuit is simply the result of
235
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the refusal to pay a licensing fee to a patent troll, equity would
dictate that an injunction should not issue.
The integrity of the patent system hinges upon courts making
the correct determination. To aid in this determination, the
Supreme Court has provided a balancing test that enables courts to
adapt to the ever-changing modem patent landscape.
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